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From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting 
empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk”, that is, a chance 
of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, 
participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable 
is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment 
decision; (ii) after the investment decision but before the resolution of the investment risk; 
(iii) after the resolution of the investment risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. 
Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under 
the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by 
anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of 
the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior 
across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in 
people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in 
earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of 
anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making. 
JEL Code: A12, C91, D81. 
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Real life situations of decision making under uncertainty, like investment, often
involve compound lotteries with multiple options and a signiﬁcant timing element.
In contrast, most economic experiments that study such behavior in the lab
are limited to simple, static and binary lotteries. From the viewpoint of the
independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting dynamic choice
problem concerns the presence of an independent “global risk”, that is, a chance
of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen.1.
Ample experimental evidence exists showing a behavioral shift towards risk
seeking if a common probability is factored into the lotteries of a binary choice
problem - the common ratio eﬀect (Allais, 1953; Camerer, 1995). Interestingly,
there is also some evidence suggesting that this shift does not occur in case of
compound lotteries where the common component of the risk of losing is presented
separately (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Cubitt et al., 1998). This has been
explained by the isolation eﬀect, according to which people ignore (transparent)
common components of alternatives. In the experiments examining the isolation
eﬀect an individual has to commit to a choice to be made conditional on a prior
act of nature (the resolution of the global risk). Cubitt et al. (1998) compare this
precommitment choice problem with the case where the resolution of the global
risk is preceding the choice. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in behavior between
these two cases, violating the dynamic choice principle of timing independence.
However, this does not exhaust the possibilities for the timing of a global risk.
Bosman and van Winden (2005) experimentally investigate investment if the
resolution of the global risk takes place after (instead of before) the resolution
of the risky option. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that people invest less than in the
absence of a global risk, which violates the isolation eﬀect.
Because of the theoretical signiﬁcance of the independence axiom, it is impor-
tant to check the robustness of these ﬁndings and the underlying determinants.
Regarding the latter, one interesting factor pointed at in various theoretical analy-
ses, but typically not accounted for in economic experiments, concerns the impact
of aﬀect (see Loewenstein et al., 2001). In a number of theories of risky choice,
the anticipation of future feelings is assumed to inﬂuence the behavior of the de-
cision makers, such as regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982), disappoint-
ment (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986), and anxiety (Wu, 1999; Caplin and
Leahy, 2001). It is an empirical question whether indeed emotions are anticipated
and taken into account and, if so, whether the anticipation is correct (Zeelenberg,
1999). More particularly, it is important to know which emotions are anticipated.
In addition to anticipated emotions also experienced emotions can inﬂuence de-
cision making under risk. Feelings are frequently claimed to inﬂuence investors
(see e.g. Sacco et al. (2003) on the emotional impact of global terrorism on in-
1Such risk concerns a speciﬁc case of “background risk” (see e.g. Gollier, 2001)
1vestment). Good and bad moods appear to inﬂuence risk behavior in laboratories
(Isen, 2001) and in the real world (Kliger and Levy, 2003). Furthermore, induced
anxiety appears to increase individuals’ preferences for low-risk/low-reward op-
tions (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). If indeed the anticipation of emotional
states is not perfect, actually experienced emotions may inﬂuence behavior in
a way that is not foreseen by the decision maker, facilitating time inconsisten-
cies. To get to know these eﬀects, a thorough analysis of both anticipated and
experienced emotions related to decision making under risk and uncertainty is
needed.
The purpose of this experimental study is to investigate (1) the isolation eﬀect
and timing independence under all possible timing options of a global risk, and
(2) the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the related choice
problems. Our main ﬁndings are a violation of the isolation eﬀect, which diﬀers
from the one observed by Bosman and van Winden (2005), and support for the
principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the diﬀerent global
risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear diﬀerences in people’s aﬀective
responses which may be responsible for the conﬂicting results observed in earlier
experiments. Dependent on the situation, diﬀerent combinations of anticipated
and experienced emotions appear to inﬂuence decision making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design
and procedures. Section 3 shows our ﬁndings concerning investment behavior,
aﬀective responses, and the relation between the two. Section 4 addresses some
diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and earlier evidence using the results of additional
experiments. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Experimental Design
Our baseline treatment concerns the following choice problem. Each participant
in the experiment is endowed with an amount of money z that s/he has to allocate
(once and for real) to two options, one of which is safe while the other is risky. The
amount allocated to the safe option is returned with certainty, yielding neither
gains nor losses. The risky option returns 2.5 times the amount invested with
probability p = 1/2, and returns nothing with probability (1 − p) = 1/2. In the
sequel, the probability p will be called the decision risk, while only the money
that is allocated to the risky option (x) will be called investment.2
2Alternatively, we could have followed the common procedure to present this decision prob-
lem as a binary choice problem concerning the prospects (A): (z) and (B): (2.5 × z, 0.5), with
(B) having the higher expected value. As will be shown below, however, this would have ob-
scured the fact that most participants deﬁnitely did not perceive our problem as a binary choice
problem.
2This Baseline treatment will be compared with several other treatments where
we add a variously timed global risk, that is, a chance (q = 1/3) that the par-
ticipant faces a zero return from both options whatever the investment decision
was (implying zero earnings from the experiment). Three possibilities exist with
respect to the timing of the resolution of the global risk (for the decision trees,
see Figure 1):
(1) GR-Pre: the global risk is resolved before the investment decision. If the
risk materializes, the participant loses the endowment and gets no further chance
of gaining money.
(2) GR-Inter: the resolution of the global risk occurs after the investment
decision but before the resolution of the decision risk (p). If the risk materializes,
the participant loses the endowment allocated to the two options, without learning
the outcome of the decision risk.
(3) GR-Post: the global risk is resolved after the investment decision and the
resolution of the decision risk. If the risk materializes, all the returns from both
the safe option and the risky option are lost.
According to classical expected utility theory (EU), the existence of a global risk
should not inﬂuence investment. Theories including a probability weighting func-
tion, e.g. rank-dependent utility theory (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory
(CPT) (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), can predict changes in be-
havior under global risk. In these theories the common risk does not cancel out
and using an inverse-S shaped probability weighting function, we should observe
more investment under global risk. This being the case if the reference point
is taken as either zero or z. Both RDU and CPT would predict no diﬀerence
between GR-Inter and GR-Post. In case of GR-Pre, according to CPT (e.g. for
a loss aversion parameter of λ = 2) we might expect less investment compared
to Baseline if a “lucky draw” will shift the reference point from zero to z. If
we allow for diﬀerent probability weighting functions, dependent on the aﬀective
strength of the situation (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), we might expect more
investment for the more aﬀect-rich situation. Finally dependent on the chosen
utility function, RDU and CPT can predict intermediate investment while classi-
cal EU (of wealth) predicts full investment. For a more detailed discussion of the
application of these theories to our investment situation, see the formal discussion
in Bosman and van Winden (2005).
As mentioned in the introduction, the existing experimental evidence is puz-
zling. While some results are in line with EU, showing no eﬀect, other results
have shown that, under certain conditions, global risk can lead to more invest-
ment (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), less investment (Bosman and van Winden,
2005) or leave investment unchanged (Cubitt et al., 1998). Our conjecture is,
that diﬀerent aﬀective reactions might be held responsible for this.
To investigate the occurrence and inﬂuence of emotions during the experiment
































1 - q x
GR-Post
z = total endowment p = probability of winning: decision risk
x = investment in risky option; x ∈ [0;z] q = probability of losing all: global risk
Figure 1: Decision trees for Baseline, GR-Inter, GR-Pre and GR-Post
both experienced and anticipated emotions are measured, using self-reports.3 The
role of the following emotions is investigated: anxiety, regret, rejoicing, disap-
pointment, hope, irritation, surprise, sadness, and happiness. We further measure
anxiety as a trait because of its hypothesized importance in case of uncertainty.
For an overview of the kind and timing of these measures, see Table 1 and Figure
2, respectively.
To gauge anxiety we use the well known Spielberger state/trait-anxiety in-
ventory, abbreviated as STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970). It is considered to be
an “excellent measure of both types [state and trait] of anxiety” (Kline, 1993)
and is widely used. A general score is computed from the detailed answers to
a series of questions (see Appendix A.1.1), which represents either the general
disposition for anxiety (trait scale) or the anxiety experienced at the moment
when the questionnaire is ﬁlled out (state scale). In the experiment, trait anxiety
(ANXIETY-trait) is measured before participants get into the lab, while state
anxiety is measured immediately before (ANXIETY-1) and after (ANXIETY-2)
3According to Robinson and Clore (2002) self-reports are “the most common and potentially
the best way to measure a person’s emotional experience”.
4Table 1: Emotion measures used in the experiment.
Variable name: Moment of measure: Comments:
anxiety(see Appendix A.1.1)
ANXIETY-trait Before start of experiment. General disposition to anxiety.
ANXIETY-1 Before decision was made. Experienced anxiety prior to decision.
ANXIETY-2 After decision was made. Experienced anxiety after taking of
decision.
regret, rejoicing and disappointment(see Appendix A.2)
Anticipated regret and rejoicing
REGRET-A After decision was made Regret as motivation for project A.
REGRET-B After decision was made Regret as motivation for project B.
REJOICE-A After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for project A.
REJOICE-B After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for project B.
Relative measure of regret (rejoicing)
REGRET-R After decision was made REGRET-A - REGRET-B
REJOICE-R After decision was made REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A
REGRET-E After decision was made. Estimation of regret
DISAPP-E After decision was made. Estimation of disappointment
REGRET-X After outcome was known. Experienced regret after outcome.
DISAPP-X After outcome was known. Experienced disappointment after
outcome.
general emotions (see Appendix A.3.2)
EMOTION After decision was made. Importance of emotions for decision
HOPE-1 Before decision was made. Experienced hope (irritation) before
the decision.
IRRITATE-1
5taking of decision outcome is announced 






















































Figure 2: Time-line of emotion measures and their respective point of reference.
the investment decision.
Based on the existing psychological evidence a negative inﬂuence of (antici-
pated) state anxiety on risk taking is predicted. Furthermore, as people with a
stronger disposition for anxiety are more likely to experience and to anticipate
this emotion, greater risk aversion is expected from participants with a higher
anxiety trait score.
Regret, rejoicing, and disappointment are measured in three diﬀerent ways (for
details, see Appendix A.2). First, we ask for the regret and rejoicing participants
anticipated when making their investment decision4 (represented by the variables
REGRET-A (B) and REJOICE-A (B) and the relative measures REGRET-R =
REGRET-A − REGRET-B and REJOICE-R = REJOICE-B − REJOICE-A).5
Where the A (B) indicates that these emotions might lead to more investment
in option A (B). Then, participants are asked to imagine a hypothetical scenario
where they lose their invested money because of a negative outcome of the risky
project. Participants have to indicate their estimated level of regret (REGRET-
E) and disappointment (DISAPP-E) using an indirect measure adopted from
Zeelenberg et al. (1998). The items of this measure have been found to be sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the two emotions. Because of the quick succession of
the two questions regarding regret, this indirect measure is chosen, to minimize
the chance that participants try to be consistent in their answers. Finally, ex-
perienced regret (REGRET-X) and disappointment (DISAPP-X) are measured
when the outcome of both risks is known. These allow us to investigate how well
4It seems that regret and rejoicing are not simply opposites of each other (Connolly and
Zeelenberg, 2002). In our experiment we will therefore measure both emotions.
5Only subjects that indicate that they took their emotions into account while making their
decision (represented by the variable EMOTION in the table), are asked about anticipated
regret and rejoicing.
6people forecast their future emotional state (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999).
Before the investment decision is taken, we also measure the experience of some
other emotions (see Appendix A.3), in particular hope and irritation because
of their speciﬁc relevance for the situation at hand (HOPE-1, IRRITATE-1).
Although the valence of these experienced emotions is diﬀerent, we expect both
of them to have a positive eﬀect on investment. However if irritation is not of the
aggressive type but related to anxiety it would rather follow the latter’s action
tendency of promoting risk aversion; (see Leith and Baumeister, 1996; MacLeod
and Byrne, 1996).
Because participants take only one decision, we will analyze the role of emo-
tions in the diﬀerent treatments from an inter-individual (between-subjects) per-
spective. Although a within-subjects design is attractive to examine treatment
eﬀects, in this case we prefer a between-subjects design to avoid any confounding
eﬀects of the decision problem6 and spillover eﬀects of experienced emotions.
2.2 Experimental procedures
Upon entering the reception room, participants were handed the ANXIETY-trait
questionnaire, which they ﬁlled out in quiet. When everybody had ﬁnished, the
participants were requested to randomly draw a seat number for the laboratory
and to put a sticker with that number on the (nameless) questionnaire before
handing it in and entering the lab. In the analysis responses to the questionnaire
could be linked to data obtained in the lab (only) through the seat number. In this
way, anonymity was maintained. In the lab, each participant received an envelope
with 15 euro in coins and bills as working money for the experiment. Participants
were told that if they would lose some of their money in the experiment they would
have to pay back the amount of the loss after the session (keeping the rest), while
earnings in excess of their working money would be paid out to them on top of
the 15 euro. After checking the content of their envelope, participants received
the instructions, which were handed out and read aloud by the experimenter (for
a translation, see Appendix B.2). In the instructions participants were informed
that they would have to allocate their working money to two projects, one of which
had a certain return (no gains, no losses), while the other had a probability of
p = 1/2 to return 2.5 times the amount invested and a probability of (1 − p) =
1/2 to return nothing. Furthermore, they were told that they would have to
determine the outcome of the risky project themselves, by rolling a dice under
supervision. In the treatments with the global risk (GR-Pre, GR-Inter, GR-Post)
they were additionally informed that they were to face a risk of q = 1/3 to lose
all their money from the experiment (see Appendix B.1.2). The resolution of
6For example, the experiment as a whole may be considered as a single dynamic choice
problem or additional incentive eﬀects may be induced through the accumulation of earnings.
Note, furthermore, that applying a random lottery incentive procedure would in fact change
the Baseline problem to a problem of type GR-Inter (see Cubitt et al., 1998).
7this global risk would again be determined by themselves, by rolling another dice
under supervision. After an opportunity for raising questions, participants went
individually through the computerized questions of the experiment.
The ﬁrst set of questions concerned the intensity with which they experi-
enced the emotions of anxiety (ANXIETY-1), hope (HOPE-1), and irritation
(IRRITATE-1), at that very moment. Subsequently, they were asked to ﬁll in
the amounts of money they would like to allocate to the projects A and B (the
fraction invested in project B will be labelled INVESTMENT). The amounts
could be any multiple of 50 eurocent and had to add up to 15 euro. In the treat-
ment GR-Pre this was preceded by the dice roll resolving the global risk.7 After
the investment decision, participants were asked to record the anxiety they ex-
perienced now that they had made their investment decision but before knowing
the outcome of the still to be resolved risk(s) (ANXIETY-2). This was followed
by the question whether they had taken their future emotions into account when
they made their decision (EMOTION) and, more speciﬁcally, to which extent
the anticipation of regret and rejoicing inﬂuenced their decision (REGRET-A[B],
REJOICE-A[B]). Next, they were asked to estimate the extent to which they
would experience regret and disappointment in case they lost their money in the
risky project (REGRET-E, DISAPP-E). Finally, participants were requested to
conﬁrm their decision, with an option to alter it if they wanted.8
The experimenters went then through the lab to have the private decision risk
resolved by the dice roll and to record the result. In the treatment GR-Inter
this was preceded by the dice roll resolving the global risk, while in GR-Post
this happened after the resolution of the decision risk. Note, however, that in
GR-Inter the decision risk was not resolved for those who lost everything. The
experiment ended with a debrieﬁng questionnaire including the question whether
the participant experienced regret (REGRET-X) about the decision taken or
disappointment (DISAPP-X) about the outcome. Participants were then paid
out in private. If earnings were less than their working money they were required
to pay back the diﬀerence.
The experiment took about one hour. All sessions took place in the CREED-
laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. Participants were recruited from
various ﬁelds of study, and in total 192 students participated in the experiment.
They received 2.50 euro as show-up fee, and on average their total earnings were
16.80 euro (approximately $ 20.20).
7Participants that lost were requested to remain seated till the experiment was over and to
answer the money allocation question hypothetically.
8Note that participants were not aware of this option when they made their investment
decision. Only very few participants changed their investment decision (altogether 9).
83 Behavioral Results
3.1 Compound Independence and the Isolation Eﬀect
An important implication of the independence axiom of rational choice the-
ory, when applied to two-stage lotteries, is compound independence. This ax-
iom states that: the two-stage lottery A yielding with probability α a ticket
for lottery X and with probability 1 − α a ticket for lottery Z, is preferred
to the two-stage lottery B, which is the same as A with Y instead of X, if
and only if the one-stage lottery X is preferred to the one-stage lottery Y (i.e.
A = (X,α;Z,(1 − α))   B = (Y,α;Z,(1 − α)) if and only if X   Y ; see Segal
(1990)). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found experimental support for this ax-
iom, using a two-stage choice problem similar to our treatment GR-Inter (with
the resolution of the global risk resolved after the decision is made but before
the resolution of the decision risk). For explanation, they suggested the existence
of an editing phase in decision making where (transparent) common components
of alternatives are cancelled – the isolation eﬀect. Several other experimental
studies reported corroborating evidence for this eﬀect (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981, 1986; Conlisk, 1989; Bernasconi, 1994). Because these studies either used
hypothetical payoﬀs or a random lottery incentive system, one may be sceptical
concerning the evidence.9 However Cubitt et al. (1998), using monetary incen-
tives in a carefully designed experiment, arrived at the same conclusion, that is,
that the isolation eﬀect holds.
In all these experimental studies people are confronted with a two-stage choice
problem similar to GR-Inter, but they are restricted to a binary choice (for either
the safe or the risky option). Our design diﬀers in this respect, by allowing par-
ticipants to allocate their money to the two projects in whatever proportion they
like, which resembles more the adjustment of a portfolio of assets. Therefore, we
focus ﬁrst on the treatments Baseline and GR-Inter, to investigate the robustness
of the isolation eﬀect. For the decision trees of the respective choice problems we
refer to Figure 1.
3.1.1 Investment: GR-Inter vs. Baseline
Figure 3 presents the distributions of the investment choices. The distributions
are clearly diﬀerent. Whereas Baseline shows a mode at half of the money be-
ing invested, the mode in GR-Inter is at full investment. Furthermore, mean
investment is 27% higher in GR-Inter (0.662 vs. 0.521), and substantially more
participants invest all their money in that treatment (23% vs. 5%). Tests10
corroborate that the distributions are diﬀerent, with investment being higher in
9See note 6 on the problematic nature of the latter procedure.
10All tests in this paper are two-sided.
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N = 39
Figure 3: INVESTMENT in Baseline and GR-Inter.
GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.011; Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.012).11
Thus, even though we took great care in making the global risk very transpar-
ent (see Appendix B), we ﬁnd evidence against compound independence and the
isolation eﬀect.
Result 1 In GR-Inter investment is higher and more extreme than in Baseline,
violating compound independence. In contrast to other studies we ﬁnd no support
for the isolation eﬀect.
Although these results cannot be explained by EU, they can be explained by
RDU and CPT (excluding the isolation eﬀect). Whether these theories can also
explain the results of the remaining treatments, GR-Pre and GR-Post, we will
see below. We ﬁrst examine the role of emotions in Baseline and GR-Inter.
3.1.2 The Role of Emotions
The question we want to address here is whether the investment level is re-
lated to emotional disposition and anticipated and experienced emotions when
the decision was made. To that purpose, we employ a (Tobit) regression model
with INVESTMENT as the dependent variable, and as independent variables:
trait anxiety (ANXIETY-trait), anticipated rejoicing (REJOICE-R)12, experi-
11We ﬁnd no eﬀect of age, ﬁeld of study (economics or not), and previous experience with
economic experiments. In total only three subjects changed their investment when they had to
conﬁrm their investment decision. Therefore, in the sequel we will focus on the initial investment
decision.
12Anticipated rejoicing was only measured for subjects responding “yes” to EMOTION. If
the answer was “no” REJOICE-R is set to equal to 0.
10Table 2: Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions.
Part A: Baseline Part B: GR-Inter
2 obs. left-censored; 1 obs. left-censored;
2 obs. right-censored 9 obs. right-censored
Number of obs = 37 Number of obs = 39
LR χ2(5) = 22.89 LR χ2(5) = 20.46
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 Prob > χ2 = 0.001
Cox Snell R2 = 0.461 Cox Snell R2 = 0.408
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t| INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.004 0.005 0.433 ANXIETY-trait -0.003 0.007 0.728
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.005 0.532 ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.005 0.952
HOPE-1 0.249 0.057 0.000 HOPE-1 0.169 0.067 0.016
IRRITATE-1 -0.100 0.052 0.062 IRRITATE-1 -0.121 0.050 0.022
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.031 0.001 REJOICE-R 0.126 0.038 0.002
Intercept -0.075 0.257 0.773 Intercept 0.431 0.313 0.178
enced anxiety (ANXIETY-1), hope (HOPE-1), and irritation (IRRITATE-1).13
Based on the evidence referred to above, we hypothesize a negative impact of
trait/state anxiety and a positive impact of rejoicing, while no speciﬁc eﬀect is
predicted for hope. The eﬀect of irritation is expected to be positive, unless it is
a correlate of anxiety, in which case the predicted eﬀect is negative.
As Table 2 shows, very similar regression results are obtained for the two treat-
ments. More speciﬁcally, none of the estimated coeﬃcients is diﬀerent across
treatments (F-test, p > 0.299). Joint estimation, using a treatment dummy for
GR-Inter, shows that GR-Inter furthers investment (dummy coeﬃcient: +0.130,
p = 0.024). Our hypotheses concerning the impact of emotions are partially
conﬁrmed. Interestingly, hope shows a positive eﬀect. Although perhaps intu-
itive, note that a relationship between risk attitude and hopefulness could not be
conﬁrmed by Chew and Ho (1994). As predicted, anticipation of more relative
rejoicing leads to higher investment. Substituting REGRET-R for REJOICE-R
leads to an opposite and weaker eﬀect (coeﬃcient: −0.066, p = 0.026). Trait and
state anxiety do not show a signiﬁcant impact on investment. The two variables
are strongly correlated (Spearman: 0.558, p = 0.000). However, even if one of
them is left out no signiﬁcance is obtained. This is surprising in light of the
psychological evidence that anxiety inﬂuences risk taking. We will return to this
issue below. Interestingly, irritation is correlated with state anxiety (Spearman:
0.244, p = 0.034) and shows a negative impact on investment.
Thus, except for the level shift in investment, it appears that emotions im-
pact investment in a very similar way in Baseline and GR-Inter. One of the
reasons why investment is higher in GR-Inter is that experienced hope, which
13We do not include REGRET-R because in both treatments REGRET-R and REJOICE-R
are strongly negatively correlated (Spearman: −0.560,p = 0.000) and, as will be shown below,
both variables can account for the same eﬀect.
11has the strongest inﬂuence in our regression model, is higher in GR-Inter.14 An-
ticipated rejoicing does not diﬀer and irritation diﬀers marginally.15 An indicator
of higher arousal in GR-Inter concerns experienced anxiety when corrected for
trait anxiety (i.e., ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-trait) which is higher in GR-Inter.16
There is some psychological evidence concerning lotteries (albeit with hypotheti-
cal payoﬀs) suggesting that arousal is related to risk seeking (Mano, 1994; Leith
and Baumeister, 1996). If so, then this would help explain the upward shift in
investment in GR-Inter.
The next result summarizes our ﬁndings.
Result 2 From a multiple (Tobit) regression model it appears that emotions have
a clear and similar impact on investment in Baseline and GR-Inter. The experi-
ence of hope and anticipated rejoicing further investment. Anticipated regret and
anticipated rejoicing are correlated, with the former having an opposite and weaker
eﬀect on investment. Neither trait anxiety nor state anxiety impact investment.
However, the experience of irritation, which positively correlates with state anxi-
ety, has a negative inﬂuence. The higher intensity of hope and arousal observed
in GR-Inter helps explain the higher level of investment in this treatment.
3.2 Timing Independence
According to Cubitt et al. (1998) the principle of timing independence requires
that “an agent, if required to precommit to an action to be taken conditional
on a prior act of nature, precommits to the action which would be chosen if the
moment of choice was delayed until after that act of nature.” If this principle of
rational choice theory holds, people confronted with choice problems similar to
GR-Inter and GR-Pre (see the decision trees in Figure 1) should show identical
investment behavior. However, in their experimental study Cubitt et al. (1998)
ﬁnd that the principle is violated, even though no signiﬁcant diﬀerence is observed
between (in our terminology) Baseline and GR-Inter and between Baseline and
GR-Pre, respectively.17 The violation is due to the combined eﬀect of more risk
seeking when the global risk is resolved after the investment decision and less
risk seeking when it is resolved before this decision is taken, compared to the
baseline without global risk. Our treatments Baseline, GR-Inter, and GR-Pre
are equivalent in terms of decision trees, except that we do not restrict decision
14The mean intensity score for HOPE-1 equals 2.946 in Baseline and 3.282 in GR-Inter
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.018) .
15The mean intensity score for IRRITATE-1 (REJOICE-R) equals 1.459 (0.412) in Baseline
and 1.846 (0.450) in GR-Inter. For REGRET-R the respective values are 0.471 and 0.450.
(Mann-Whitney, regret: p = 0.820; rejoicing: p = 0.834; irritation: p = 0.071)
16ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-trait equals 5.385 in GR-Inter vs. 0.324 in Baseline (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0.043).
17In their terminology, the ’scaled-up problem’ vs. the ’precommitment problem’ and the
’prior problem’, respectively.





























mean: 0.61; std. dev: 0.26
N = 48
Figure 4: INVESTMENT in GR-Pre.
making to a binary choice. Therefore, we want to see whether the principle of
timing independence is also violated in our case.
3.2.1 Investment: GR-Inter vs. GR-Pre
As announced in the instructions to the participants (see Appendix B.2), in treat-
ment GR-Pre the global risk was resolved before the investment decision. Those
who could continue were, on the face of it, presented with the same decision prob-
lem as participants in Baseline. The others, for whom the global risk draw was
unfavorable, were asked to answer the questions hypothetically, with no money
to be earned. Figure 4 presents the distribution of investment in GR-Pre (for
those that could continue because of a lucky draw).18
The distribution seems similar to GR-Inter and indeed, statistically, no dif-
ference in investment is found (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.247; Kolmogorov-Smirnov,
p = 0.312). Thus, contrary to Cubitt et al. (1998), we ﬁnd no evidence of a
violation of timing independence. In line with the results obtained by these au-
thors, we also ﬁnd no diﬀerence in investment between GR-Pre and Baseline
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.117; Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.454).
Result 3 Investment in GR-Pre is similar to GR-Inter and to Baseline. Con-
trary to Cubitt et al. (1998), no violation of timing independence is observed.
Because RDU and CPT can also explain these outcomes, they survive as ex-
planatory theories of our results so far. Note with respect to CPT that one has
to assume here that no signiﬁcant shift in reference point has occurred in GR-Pre
18Investment of those who lost and could give only hypothetical answers is higher (mean:
0.68, std. dev: 0.27), but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.266).
13(from 0 to z), because this should have induced less investment, according to this
theory.
We want to point out some (qualitative) aspects diﬀerentiating the three treat-
ments, which adds a caveat to Result 3. This concerns the shape of the investment
distributions. The frequency of full investment in GR-Pre (23%) is identical to
GR-Inter (23%) but remarkably higher than the frequency in Baseline (5%; Pear-
son χ2, p < 0.029). Moreover, in GR-Pre as well as in GR-Inter full investment is
also the mode. Another concern relates to the role of emotions to which we turn
next.
3.2.2 The Role of Emotions
Remarkably, the (Tobit) regression model of investment, which was successfully
employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, fails to reach signiﬁcance for GR-Pre (χ2 =
0.152; see Table 4 in Appendix C). Only anticipated rejoicing appears to have a
(positive) eﬀect on investment, but weaker than in the previous two treatments
(coeﬃcient REJOICE-R: +0.080, p = 0.024). Thus, even though, equality of
the investment distributions cannot be rejected, from an emotion point of view
these treatments nevertheless appear to be diﬀerent. Three other diﬀerences
show up when we take a closer look at the remaining emotion variables of the
model: anxiety, hope, and irritation. First, while little variation is observed in
trait-anxiety19, more anxiety is experienced in GR-Pre than in Baseline, as was
found for GR-Inter.20 Apparently, global risk elicits greater anxiety, independent
of whether its resolution just happened or is about to take place soon. A similar
diﬀerence is observed for hope, with more hope being experienced in both global
risk treatments.21 As discussed for GR-Inter, higher arousal may have positively
inﬂuenced investment in GR-Pre. These additional ﬁndings in turn suggest that,
compared to Baseline, the global risk treatments are more alike in this respect.
Result 4 GR-Pre cannot be explained with the regression model that is success-
fully employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, showing that emotions are not a mere
correlate of investment. Only anticipated rejoicing shows again a positive (but
weaker) eﬀect on investment.
While GR-Pre and GR-Inter resemble each other in some emotional respects,
they diﬀer in others. This restricts our conﬁdence in statistical results ignoring
emotions. Factors inﬂuencing emotional intensity (like vividness or closeness) that
19The distribution of ANXIETY-trait in our experiment (all treatments: mean: 35.74, std.
dev: 8.16) is very similar to the one observed in a psychology experiment at the same university,
involving 493 subjects (mean: 35.29, std. dev:9.69) (t-test, p = 0.569).
20Controlling for trait-anxiety by taking the diﬀerence ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-trait, we
ﬁnd for Baseline: 0.32, and for GR-Pre: 5.71 (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.020).
21HOPE-1 equals 2.95 in Baseline vs. 3.35 in GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.003).
14have not been controlled for in experimental studies so far may have aﬀected the
results. This sets an important agenda for future research.
Another unexpected ﬁnding concerns predictions from the mood maintenance
hypothesis (see e.g. Isen and Simmonds, 1978). According to this hypothesis
people may become more risk averse when they are happy, in order not to risk
loosing their good mood (which has a positive hedonic value). In case of GR-Pre
this would suggest that people being happy after surviving the global risk would
invest less. Incidentally, this might help explain the violation of timing indepen-
dence observed by Cubitt et al. (1998), because they indeed ﬁnd that investment
is less when the global risk is resolved before making the choice between the safe
and the risky option. Unfortunately, they do not have the required data on aﬀect
to test this. Surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd that people with a lucky draw in GR-Pre
are happier.22 Moreover, happiness is not correlated with investment (Spearman,
0.172, p = 0.244).23
3.3 Adding GR-Post
Our main ﬁndings so far are a violation of the isolation eﬀect (with more invest-
ment in GR-Inter than in Baseline), support for timing independence (GR-Pre vs.
GR-Inter), and evidence that, aﬀectively, people do not experience the various
(global risk) treatments in the same way. Furthermore, RDU and CPT survived
as explanatory theories. We will now check the robustness of these ﬁndings by
adding the results of our remaining treatment GR-Post (for its decision tree, see
Figure 1).
Before we do so, we ﬁrst extend Cubitt et al.’s deﬁnition of timing indepen-
dence to include the new timing of the global risk: an agent, if required to pre-
commit to an action to be taken conditional on a prior act of nature, precommits
to the action which would be chosen if the moment of choice was delayed until
after that act of nature or if the act of nature were to be delayed till after the
outcome of the action.
Furthermore, note that from the perspective of RDU and CPT investment in
GR-Post should be the same as in GR-Inter. This suggests that we should also
observe higher investment in GR-Post, compared to Baseline.24 On the other
hand, Bosman and van Winden (2005) found lower investment in their treatment
22In all treatments experienced happiness is approximately 2.8 (Kruskal-Wallis, p = 0.932).
23There is also no correlation between happiness and investment in the other treatments
(Spearman, approx. −0.02, p > 0.829). Interestingly, though, sadness is negatively correlated
with investment in GR-Pre (Spearman, −0.379, p = 0.008), whereas no correlation is observed
in the other treatments (Spearman, approx. −0.06, p > 0.597).
24If we substitute certainty equivalents at nodes and then calculate backwards (Segal, 1990),
compared to Baseline, similar investment would be predicted for GR-Inter and for GR-Post (or
possibly more for the latter; see Bosman and van Winden, 2005). The global risk should have
no eﬀect in GR-Inter, as is easily seen from the decision tree. In contrast, we have observed a
substantial increase in investment in GR-Inter.
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Figure 5: INVESTMENT in GR-Post.
where the global risk was resolved after the resolution of the decision risk, a result
that ﬂies in the face of both RDU and CPT. Because our design seems to diﬀer
only in the use of more extensive measures of emotions and in using euros instead
of guilders, a similar outcome is expected for GR-Post.
3.3.1 Investment across treatments
Figure 5 presents the distribution of investment in GR-Post. Surprisingly, in our
case, investment is clearly not smaller when compared to Baseline (see Figure 3).
Although mean investment is even higher in GR-Post (0.62 vs. 0.52), statistically,
we ﬁnd only some weak evidence of a diﬀerence with Baseline, and no evidence
of a diﬀerence with GR-Inter and GR-Pre (see Table 6 in Appendix C for the
statistics, concerning all treatments). Thus, also with this treatment included,
we ﬁnd no violation of timing independence.
Result 5 Including GR-Post, we ﬁnd no evidence of a diﬀerence in the distribu-
tion of investment between the global risk treatments GR-Pre, GR-Inter and GR-
Post, supporting timing independence. However, as observed for GR-Pre (Result
3), there is also no (clear) evidence of a diﬀerence between Baseline and GR-Post
in contrast with what is observed for GR-Inter (Result 1). It appears that GR-Pre
and GR-Post are distribution-wise in between Baseline and GR-Inter.
Although, statistically, we observe only a diﬀerence between Baseline and GR-
Inter, remarkably, in all treatments involving global risk we see a very similar
proportion of full investment (circa 23%), which is higher than in Baseline (Pear-
son χ2, p < 0.029).25 If we restrict our attention to participants that invested
25In contrast, Bosman and van Winden (2005) ﬁnd a similar fraction of full investment for
both their baseline and ’post’ treatment. We will return to this below.
16only part of their working money (i.e., INVESTMENT < 1) we still observe
some tendency towards larger investment in GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.122;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.140), and no diﬀerence between Baseline and the re-
maining global risk treatments. The higher observed means in these treatments
are mainly due to diﬀerences in participants choosing full instead of intermediate
investment.
Next, we will again turn to the role of emotions to examine how people af-
fectively experience the timing of the global risk, which can help improve our
understanding of the behavioral results.
3.3.2 Comparing the Role of Emotions
It turns out that our Tobit model of investment — successful in explaining in-
vestment in Baseline and GR-Inter, but not in GR-Pre — is also not signiﬁcant
for GR-Post (χ2 = 0.269; see Appendix C). The only coeﬃcient showing (weak)
signiﬁcance relates to experienced irritation, and has a positive sign (coeﬃcient:
+0.130, p = 0.078).26 Also, only in this treatment there is no clear eﬀect of
anticipated rejoicing as measured by REJOICE-R (p = 0.119). We will return to
this below.
For a better understanding of the diﬀerences across treatments, we compare
the role played by emotions in the various treatments (see Table 3).
One of our hypothesis is that the presence of global risk will lead to higher
experienced anxiety, compared to Baseline. While little variation is observed
in trait anxiety27, experienced anxiety is indeed higher in GR-Pre, and GR-
Inter (see Table 3:A). Controlling for trait-anxiety by looking at ANXIETY-
diﬀerence (= ANXIETY-1 - ANXIETY-trait), more anxiety is experienced in
GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.028) and GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.134,
compared to Baseline and GR-Post). Somewhat surprisingly, this does not apply
to GR-Post, where the resolution of the threat to lose all income is to take place
at the very end of the experiment. This suggests that anxiety is particularly
elicited if the global risk is either just experienced or is to be experienced in the
near(er) future. A similar outcome is obtained for hope. The experience of hope
is higher in GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.016) and GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney,
p < 0.075), compared to Baseline and GR-Post. This suggests that even though
behavior may seem similar in the presence of global risk, treatments are aﬀec-
tively appraised as being diﬀerent. Whereas GR-Pre and GR-Inter clearly diﬀer
regarding the prospect of the global risk, they elicit hope and anxiety to a very
similar degree. In remarkable contrast, GR-Post appears to diﬀer from GR-Inter
in this respect, even though the former seems only a slight variation of the latter
(which is neglected by RDU and CPT).
26A similar result is obtained if irritation is directly correlated with investment (Spearman,
+0.259, p = 0.099).
27See note 19.
17An interesting further diﬀerence between the treatments is found with respect
to the emotions regret, rejoicing and disappointment.
Since in GR-Inter global risk is resolved before the decision risk, subjects will
not learn in 1/3 of the cases if they made the “right” decision or not. Thus, on
average, the anticipation of regret and rejoicing may be expected to be less related
to investment in GR-Inter than in GR-Post. Anticipation of regret (rejoicing) was
measured through questions about the importance of avoiding (seeking) regret
(rejoicing) when making the investment decision. For example, regarding project
A participants were requested to indicate to what extent the following statements
were applicable to them (similar questions for project B; see Appendix A):
1. I did not put more money in B, because I did not want to feel really bad
when project B returns nothing (loses). [REGRET-A]
2. I did not put less money in A, because I will feel really good if project B
returns nothing (loses). [REJOICE-A]
From the answers we can see whether participants took the possibility into
account of (not) having to experience regret (rejoicing). Our ﬁrst observation is
that the average scores for these questions are not diﬀerent across treatments.28
In all treatments, people report to have thought to an equal degree about regret
and rejoicing. However, not in all treatments these answers are similarly related
to their investment decisions. Correlation coeﬃcients show that the focus of
regret and rejoicing diﬀered (see Table 3: B). For all treatments we observe
that REGRET-A is stronger correlated with investment than REGRET-B. Thus,
insofar as regret is concerned people always seem to focus more on the safe project.
Regarding rejoicing, though, there are variations across treatments. In both
Baseline and GR-Inter, REJOICE-A is stronger correlated with investment than
REJOICE-B, suggesting that in these treatments the focus is more on the safe
project when it comes to rejoicing. This is in contrast with both GR-Pre and GR-
Post where rejoicing is mostly related to investment in project B. Furthermore,
note that in Baseline only REGRET-A is correlated with investment, whereas
in all treatments with global risk (also) some correlation with REJOICE-B is
observed.
We further ﬁnd that regret is mostly correlated with investment in treatments
where these emotions can be prominent at the very end of the experiment. This
singles out GR-Post, because here it is the emotion of disappointment (about
the resolution of the global risk) that is prominent at the end. The ‘peak-end’
rule of memory may play a role here (see Kahneman et al., 1993; Schreiber and
Kahneman, 2000; Kahneman, 2000). This rule refers to the ﬁnding that strongest
intensity and ﬁnal experience deﬁne the memory of the utility of a situation.
28We cannot reject that REGRET-A (B) and REJOICE-A (B) are from the same distribution
across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis, p > 0.180).
18Table 3: Correlations and averages of emotions.
A: Averages experienced and estimated emotions (std. deviation in parentheses)
Baseline GR-Pre GR-Inter GR-Post
ANXIETY-trait 35.43 (8.26) 34.42 (8.84) 35.10 (7.18) 37.24 (7.72)
ANXIETY-1 35.76 (7.29) 40.13 (10.08) 40.49 (11.94) 38.14 (8.48)
ANXIETY-diﬀerence 0.32 (7.40) 5.71 (9.55) 5.39 (10.28) 0.91 (9.14)
HOPE-1 2.95 (0.57) 3.35 (0.64) 3.28 (0.65) 3.02 (0.64)
IRRITATE-1 1.46 (0.65) 1.40 (0.64) 1.85 (0.93) 1.57 (0.80)
REGRET-A 2.65 (1.17) 2.70 (1.18) 2.80 (1.15) 2.75 (1.11)
REJOICE-A 2.47 (1.18) 1.97 (1.01) 2.30 (1.08) 2.29 (0.95)
REGRET-B 2.18 (1.13) 2.00 (1.08) 2.35 (1.14) 2.58 (0.93)
REJOICE-B 2.88 (1.11) 3.03 (1.01) 2.75 (1.21) 3.17 (0.82)
REGRET-E 6.16 (2.15) 5.42 (2.28) 5.69 (2.18) 5.98 (2.05)
DISAPP-E 6.86 (2.17) 6.77 (2.15) 7.18 (1.73) 7.02 (1.92)
REGRET-X 1.57 (0.80) 1.42 (0.71) 1.51 (0.76) 1.36 (0.53)
DISAPP-X 1.92 (1.16) 2.13 (1.18) 2.49 (1.27) 2.40 (1.19)
B: (Spearman) correlation coeﬃcients of investment with:
REGRET-A REJOICE-A
Baseline -0.554 p = 0.021 -0.377 p = 0.136
GR-Pre -0.432 p = 0.008 -0.304 p = 0.068
GR-Inter -0.528 p = 0.017 -0.707 p = 0.001
GR-Post -0.249 p = 0.241 -0.277 p = 0.190
REGRET-B REJOICE-B
Baseline -0.235 p = 0.364 0.134 p = 0.609
GR-Pre -0.303 p = 0.068 0.440 p = 0.006
GR-Inter 0.222 p = 0.347 0.383 p = 0.096
GR-Post 0.070 p = 0.744 0.530 p = 0.008
C: (Spearman) correlation coeﬃcients of estimated and experienced:
disappointment regret
Baseline 0.200 p = 0.457 0.660 p = 0.005
GR-Pre -0.031 p = 0.885 0.410 p = 0.042
GR-Inter 0.252 p = 0.430 0.537 p = 0.072
GR-Post 0.349 p = 0.324 0.618 p = 0.057
19If this eﬀect does not only exist for the creation of memory but also for the
anticipation of utility, this might explain our ﬁndings. Comparing the situations
of GR-Inter and GR-Post, through the timing of the global risk, the former would
generate more anxiety and hope and a stronger focus on regret and rejoicing
than the latter. Which is what we observe. Although GR-Inter and GR-Post are
equivalent in RDU and CPT, aﬀectively they are experienced as being diﬀerent.
Responses to the question (posed after the investment decision) how one would
feel if the invested money would be lost with the resolution of the decision risk
show that estimated regret and disappointment for this scenario (REGRET-E and
DISAPP-E) do not diﬀer across treatments (Table 3:A). Estimated regret is in
all treatments correlated with actually experienced regret if the invested money
was indeed lost.29 Because the loss of invested money should be less related to
disappointment, it is not surprising that in all treatments we ﬁnd no correlation
of estimated and experienced disappointment (see Table 3: C).30 Interestingly, in
all cases experienced regret is overestimated.31
The next result summarizes our ﬁndings concerning GR-Post.
Result 6 As holds for GR-Pre, investment in GR-Post cannot be explained with
the regression model that helps explain behavior in Baseline and GR-Inter. At the
individual emotion level, anticipated rejoicing is again found to be positively corre-
lated with investment, but in this case only if restricted to the rejoicing anticipated
from taking risk (REJOICE-B). Furthermore, experienced irritation appears to be
positively related to investment, in contrast with Baseline and GR-Inter (nega-
tive correlation) and GR-Pre (no correlation). The experienced amount of hope
and anxiety is more like in Baseline than in GR-Pre and GR-Inter where the
resolution of the global risk precedes the resolution of the decision risk.
The ﬁndings of this section can be summarized as follows.
SUMMARY
• While compound independence cannot be rejected in GR-Post, the isolation
eﬀect is violated in GR-Inter.
• Timing independence cannot be rejected.
29For the correlations of estimated and experienced regret (REGRET-E and REGRET-X)
and disappointment (DISAPP-E and DISAPP-X) we consider only participants who actually
lost with project B and survived the global risk.
30Experienced regret and disappointment are correlated with the amount of money the par-
ticipant lost due to the negative outcome of the relevant risk. In all treatments, if money was
lost due to the decision risk, regret is experienced (Spearman, ≈ 0.35, p < 0.064). For GR-Inter
and GR-Post, we also ﬁnd correlations between disappointment and the loss of money due to
the global risk (Spearman, ≈ 0.55, p < 0.000).
31Regressing experienced regret on estimated regret shows a coeﬃcient smaller than 1.
20• Full investment seems higher in the presence of global risk.
• The same aﬀect model helps explain investment in Baseline and GR-Inter,
showing similar coeﬃcients for anticipated rejoicing (+), experienced hope
(+), and experienced irritation (−).
• Aﬀect functions diﬀerently in GR-Pre and GR-Post. Only anticipated re-
joicing is (positively) correlated with investment in both. In addition, ex-
perienced irritation is found to be correlated with investment in GR-Post,
but with a positive sign.
• On average, across treatments, participants are similarly motivated by an-
ticipated regret and rejoicing, but the relation with investment diﬀers. An-
other indicator showing that, aﬀectively, treatments are appraised as being
diﬀerent is that the experience of hope and anxiety is of higher intensity
in GR-Pre and GR-Inter where a global risk (arguably the more dramatic
risk) is present but resolved before the resolution of the decision risk.
• Estimated regret from a bad outcome of the decision risk does not diﬀer
across treatments. The regret that is actually experienced is overestimated.
4 Discussion and Further Evidence
Our results are surprisingly diﬀerent from the ﬁndings of the two most related
studies: Cubitt et al, (1998) and Bosman and van Winden (2005). In contrast
with the former study, we ﬁnd evidence against the isolation eﬀect but not against
the principle of timing independence. Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd that people
invest less in GR-Post, compared to Baseline, which contrasts with the latter
study. How to explain these behavioral diﬀerences? Because of our multiple ﬁnd-
ings that (anticipated and experienced) emotions play a role in the investment
decision, we conjecture that factors inﬂuencing emotional intensity (like vivid-
ness or closeness), which have not been controlled for in these studies, may have
aﬀected the results. To substantiate this claim we will focus on the diﬀerence
between our ﬁndings and those of Bosman and van Winden (in the sequel, indi-
cated as BvW), concerning GR-Post. Two potentially important issues will be
addressed: the inﬂuence of emotion measures and the amount of money that is
at stake.32
32For completeness sake, we mention two more diﬀerences with the design of Bosman and
van Winden. First, in their study subjects had to put the bills and coins of their endowment in
two cups on their table, whereas in our case the allocation decision was made on the computer.
Second, in our GR-Post the resolution of the global risk took place in the lab, immediately
after the resolution of the decision risk, while in the study of Bosman and van Winden this
happened when participants were (individually) paid out. Finally, remember that in our case
participants started with ﬁlling out the ANXIETY-trait questionnaire in the reception room,
before they entered the lab.
21As acknowledged in the psychological literature (e.g. Lerner and Keltner,
2001), emotion measures may inﬂuence aﬀect, and thereby behavior, by inducing
people to focus on their emotional experience. Because only in our study emo-
tion measures were applied before the investment decision was made33, this may
partly explain the diﬀerent results. For example, it may be that the Spielberger
questionnaires used to measure (trait and state) anxiety have contributed to the
anxiety and irritation that participants experienced. If so, this could explain why
we observe less investment in Baseline and more in GR-Post than Bosman and van
Winden.34 To check out this potential eﬀect, we replicated Baseline and GR-Post,
omitting the self-report measures in the lab prior to the taking of the decision.
These new treatments will be labelled Baseline-without and GR-Post-without.
The second issue to be examined concerns the amount of working money (stake
size). In all our treatments we endowed the participants with 15 euro as working
money, to be allocated to the two projects in multiples of 50 eurocent. This was
based on the 30 guilders used by Bosman and van Winden (2005) in their global
risk experiment (similar to our GR-Post) – where participants had to allocate the
money in multiples of one guilder – and an exchange rate of approximately 2 to
1. However, we have the impression that people may have perceived the 15 euro
as being of less value, and perhaps more like 15 guilders35. Therefore, we also
replicated Baseline and GR-Post using an endowment of 30 euro (to be allocated
in multiples of 1 euro). These two new treatments will be labelled Baseline-high
and GR-Post-high.36
4.1 Further Evidence on Investment Behavior
Investment behavior in the additional treatments is shown in Figure 6. We fo-
cus ﬁrst on Baseline-without and GR-Post-without. There are indications of a
distributional shift in the direction of BvW: a shift towards higher investment in
Baseline-without and towards lower investment in GR-Post-without, with modal
investment coinciding now at 2/3 and a less pronounced diﬀerence in the fre-
quency of full investment. As in BvW, adding the global risk seems to negatively
aﬀect investment, albeit that the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant in this case (Mann-
33Cubitt et al. (1998) did not measure emotions at all, while Bosman and van Winden only
used self-reports after the investment decision.
34Because anxiety in Baseline might lead to less risk taking, while additional anxiety in
GR-Post might have the opposite eﬀect.
35Even though a study by Koebberling et al. (2004) suggests no eﬀect of the change from
guilders to euros.
36Experimental procedures were the same as for Baseline-low and GR-Post-low. However,
in the without treatments participants did not have to ﬁll out the ANXIETY-1 questionnaire
and were not asked about experienced emotions before they had to make their decision. In
total, 151 students participated. Participants received again 2.50 euro as show-up fee, while
their average earnings were 14 euro (approximately $17) in the without treatments and 36 euro
(approximately $44) in the high treatments.







































0 1/6 1/3 1/2 2/3 5/6 1
GR-Post-without














































Figure 6: INVESTMENT in Baseline[GR-Post]-without and Baseline[GR-Post]-
high.
Whitney, p = 0.530).37 Thus, the additional emotion measures applied immedi-
ately before the investment decision seem (partly) responsible for the divergence
in ﬁndings.
One ﬁnding of BvW is still missing, which is the inverted-U shaped investment
distribution (over the interval [1/3,1]) in case of the global risk. Interestingly,
this phenomenon shows up if we turn to the treatments with the higher stake:
Baseline-high and GR-Post-high. In GR-Post-high there is crowding out of in-
vestment in the open interval (1/3,1), with a remarkable downward shift in modal
investment (from 1 to 1/3), generating a clear U-shaped investment distribution.38
37Excluding extreme (full) investment, the diﬀerence becomes signiﬁcant at the 20% level
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.166). Comparing the without treatments with the respective earlier
treatments, we ﬁnd weak evidence of a diﬀerence for Baseline and Baseline-without, using a
Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.105).
38Compared to the lower stake treatments, we ﬁnd weak evidence of a diﬀerence in distribu-
tions for GR-Post and GR-Post-high, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = 0.092).
23With the exception of the mode in Baseline-high being at 1/3 instead of 2/3, the
results of the high treatments look very similar to the ones obtained by BvW.
Observation 1 The measurement of emotions immediately before the investment
decision, together with a diﬀerent amount of money being at stake, seems re-
sponsible for our ﬁnding that in contrast to BvW investment in GR-Post is not
signiﬁcantly lower than in Baseline.
4.2 Further Evidence on the Role of Emotions
The Tobit model of investment that is successful in explaining investment in
Baseline and GR-Inter but not in GR-Pre and GR-Post, is again helpful for the
new treatments Baseline-high and GR-Post-high where also experienced emotions
were measured before the investment decision (see Appendix C). In the former,
the coeﬃcients of experienced hope and anticipated rejoicing are again signiﬁcant
and of very similar magnitude as in Baseline. The main diﬀerence is experienced
irritation, the coeﬃcient of which is no longer (weakly) signiﬁcant. Interestingly,
in contrast with GR-Post, the model is signiﬁcant for GR-Post-high. It shows a
larger and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for anticipated rejoicing. While the coeﬃcient
of experienced irritation is again positive and has kept almost exactly the same
size, its signiﬁcance has dropped to the 20% level. Apparently, the larger stake
in these treatments diminishes the role of irritation.
Because we do not ﬁnd clear statistical evidence of a diﬀerence in the invest-
ment distributions of the respective high and lower stake treatments, we further
mention the regression results of grouping the observations from the lower and
higher stakes treatments, labelled Baseline-grouped and GR-Post-grouped. Both
models are highly signiﬁcant (prob > chi2 = 0.000). Regarding Baseline-grouped
we ﬁnd similar coeﬃcients as before for experienced hope and anticipated rejoic-
ing (hope: 0.220, p = 0.000; REJOICE-R: 0.097, p = 0.000), while the coeﬃcient
of experienced irritation is again insigniﬁcant (as in Baseline-high). For GR-Post-
grouped we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of anticipated rejoicing is closer to the one
obtained in Gr-Post-high (REJOICE-R: 0.127, p = 0.000), while the coeﬃcient of
experienced irritation is as before, but is now clearly signiﬁcant (irritation: 0.133,
p = 0.018).39
Surprisingly, so far we have not found any direct evidence of an eﬀect of (trait
and state) anxiety. Neither for trait-anxiety nor for state-anxiety diﬀerences be-
tween the treatments are found (Kruskal-Wallis, p > 0.202).40 Only for Baseline-
grouped (now including Baseline-without) we ﬁnd a (weakly) signiﬁcant negative
39The diﬀerent role played by irritation across these treatments also shows up in the fact that
it is not correlated with (both trait and state) anxiety in GR-Post-grouped whereas there is a
positive correlation in Baseline-grouped.
40The diﬀerence ANXIETY-1 − ANXIETY-trait is on average larger in the high treatments
(2.410 vs. 0.324 in Baseline; 2.966 vs. 0.905 in GR-Post). This diﬀerence seems to point at
some higher arousal in the treatments with a larger stake, in line with emotion theory.
24correlation between trait-anxiety and investment if, in addition, investment is cat-
egorized into low, middle, and high investment (Spearman, −0.171, p = 0.064).
Another piece of evidence, this time concerning state-anxiety, is obtained from
a linear regression with the ﬁnally conﬁrmed (and sometimes changed) invest-
ment level as dependent variable and, as independent variables, INVESTMENT
and ANXIETY-2 (anxiety experienced after the investment decision, but before
conﬁrmation). Using the data of Baseline-grouped and GR-Post-grouped, with
in both cases six participants who changed their decision, we ﬁnd for the former
as well as the latter a negative eﬀect of ANXIETY-2.41 Interestingly, the eﬀect
of state-anxiety vanishes completely if ANXIETY-1, instead of ANXIETY-2, is
used.
Result 7 The Tobit investment model is helpful also for explaining investment
in the additional treatments (Baseline-high and GR-Post-high) and if treatments
are grouped together (Baseline-grouped and GR-Post-grouped). The coeﬃcients
of anticipated rejoicing, experienced hope, and experienced irritation are quite
similar in Baseline, Baseline-high and Baseline-grouped, as well as in GR-Post,
GR-Post-high and GR-Post-grouped. The only exception concerns irritation in
the baseline treatments (which loses the weak signiﬁcance it had in Baseline).
Finally, using grouped observations we also ﬁnd some weak evidence of a negative
eﬀect of trait and state anxiety on investment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a comprehensive study aimed at investigating decisions
under all the possible timing options of a global risk that can not be inﬂuenced
by the decision maker. In contrast with earlier studies neither an isolation eﬀect
nor a violation of timing independence was observed. Regarding the latter, no
statistical diﬀerence in behavior was found when comparing the eﬀect of a global
risk being resolved before the decision has to be made with situations where the
decision maker has to decide without yet knowing the outcome of the global risk.
Even though behavior is more or less the same across our global risk treatments,
variations in the aﬀective responses across treatments were found. It was argued
that these diﬀerences may very well explain the conﬂicting results from earlier
experiments.
41Regression coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance for Baseline-grouped (N = 119): investment, 0.966
(p = 0.000); ANXIETY-2, −0.002 (p = 0.000); intercept, 0.074 (p = 0.000). Same for GR-
Post-grouped (N = 111): investment, 1.000 (p = 0.000); ANXIETY-2, −0.001 (p = 0.046);
intercept, 0.033, (p = 0.042). In both cases, the without treatment is included.
25A Emotion measures (translated from Dutch)
A.1 State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970)
A.1.1 STAI-trait
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the right
of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer
which seems to describe how you generally feel.
almost never almost always
1. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I tire quickly (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I feel like crying (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I wish I could be as happy as others
seem to be
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I am losing out on things because I
can’t make up my mind soon enough
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
7. I am “calm, cool and collected” (1) (2) (3) (4)
8. I feel that diﬃculties are piling up so
that I cannot overcome them
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9. I worry too much over something that
really doesn’t matter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I am happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I am inclined to take things hard (1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I lack self-conﬁdence (1) (2) (3) (4)
13. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I try to avoid facing a crisis or diﬃ-
culty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I feel blue (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I am content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. Some unimportant thought runs
through my mind and bothers me
(1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I take disappointments so keenly that
I can’t put them out of my mind
(1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I am a steady person (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil
as I think over my recent concerns and
interests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
26Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20 and 80, representing
the anxiety trait of the subject [ANXIETY-trait].
In the experiment the validated Dutch translation of the STAI was used
(van der Ploeg et al., 1980).
A.1.2 STAI-state
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the
right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
not at all very much so
1. I feel calm (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I am tense (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I am regretful (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I feel at ease (1) (2) (3) (4)
6. I feel upset (1) (2) (3) (4)
7. I am presently worrying over pos-
sible misfortunes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
8. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
9. I feel anxious (1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I feel comfortable (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I feel self-conﬁdent (1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I feel nervous (1) (2) (3) (4)
13. I am jittery (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I feel “high strung” (1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I am relaxed (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I feel content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. I am worried (1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I feel over-excited and “rattled” (1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I feel joyful (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20 and 80, representing
the anxiety state at that moment in time. [ANXIETY-1][ANXIETY-2]
27A.2 Regret
A.2.1 Anticipated regret and rejoicing
To which extent are the following remarks for your decision applicable?
not at all very much so
1. For project A: I did not put more
money in A, because I did not want to
feel really bad when project B ends well
(wins). regret as motivation for project
B [REGRET-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2. For project A: I did not put less money
in A, because I will feel really good
if project B returns nothing (loses).
rejoicing as motivation for project A
[REJOICE-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3. For project B: I did not put less money
in B, because I will feel really good if
project B ends well (wins). rejoicing as
motivation for project B [REJOICE-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4. For project B: I did not put more
money in B, because I did not want
to feel really bad when project B re-
turns nothing (loses). regret as motiva-
tion for project A [REGRET-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Comments in italics and brackets were not included in the questionnaire
and refer to the descriptions made in the text.
To account for relative importance of regret and rejoicing we deﬁne:
[REGRET-R] = REGRET-A - REGRET-B
[REJOICE-R] = REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A
A.2.2 Estimated regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 1998)
We ask you now to think about the money that you invested in project B (no
matter how much it was). Imagine that you roll the white dice and that you get
a 5. Which means that you lost the money that you had invested in project B.
How do you feel then?
28not at all very much so
1. Feel powerless? (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Feel that you should have known bet-
ter?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3. Feel the tendency to kick myself? (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. Feel the tendency to get away from the
situation?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5. Want to undo the event? (1) (2) (3) (4)
6. Want to do nothing? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Items 2, 3 and 5 measured [REGRET-E], the remaining items measured
[DISAPP-E].
A.2.3 Experienced regret
Please answer the following questions:
not at all very much so
1. Are you disappointed by the outcome? (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Do you regret your decision? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers give [REGRET-X] and [DISAPP-X].
A.3 Other Emotions
A.3.1 Experienced emotions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the
right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
not at all very much so
1. I feel surprised (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I feel hopeful (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I feel sad (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I feel happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I feel irritated (1) (2) (3) (4)
A.3.2 Importance of emotions for decision
At the end of the second questionnaire for STAI state, the following question was
asked, to determine if subjects took emotions into account when making their
decision:
29Was your decision inﬂuenced by how you might feel after the rolling
of the white dice, which will determine the outcome of project B?
[EMOTION]
B Instructions
Translated from the Dutch
B.1 Announcement of Global Risk
B.1.1 GR-Pre
Announcement earnings
At the start of phase 2 of this experiment there is a chance of 1/3
that you will lose all your working money and thus can’t earn money.
Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. At the start
of phase 2, thus before deciding about the distribution of the working money,
each participant will be asked to roll this die a single time under supervision. If
the die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your working money. If the die shows 1,
2, 3 or 4, you will keep your working money. Please note, your earnings depend on




At the start of phase 3 of this experiment there is a chance of 1/3
that you will lose all your possible earnings.
Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. At the start of
phase 3, thus before the outcome of the projects is determined, each participant
will be asked to roll this die a single time under supervision. If the die shows 5
or 6, you will lose all your possible earnings. If the die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4,
you will keep your possible earnings. Please note, your earnings depend on the
decision that you will take now, in phase 2.
B.1.3 GR-Post
Announcement earnings
At the end of phase 3 of this experiment there is a chance of 1/3
that you will lose all your earnings.
30Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. After the
end of the phase 3, thus after the outcome of the projects is determined, each
participant will be asked to roll this die a single time under supervision. If the
die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your earnings. If the die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4,
you will keep your earnings. Please note, your earnings depend on the decision
that you will take now, in phase 2.
B.2 General instructions
Information about projects
In this phase you have to make a single decision concerning your working
money. You have to allocate the 15 euro [30 euro] that you received over two
projects. These projects will be labelled on the computer screen, when you make
your decision, with the letters A and B.
In project A you will get for every euro that you put into this project, one
euro. Thus, project A always gives a certain return. For the amount that you
put in project B the following holds. With probability one half (1/2) you will
lose this amount and with probability one half (1/2) you will receive two and a
half (2 1/2) times this amount.
You can allocate your working money in multiples of 50 eurocent [1 euro] over
the projects A and B in any possible combination that sums up to 15 euro [30
euro]. The table below shows for each possible combination that you can choose
the returns and corresponding probabilities. All values are in euros.
B.2.1 Baseline
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns of project B.
Each participant has just received a white die. In the next phase everyone will
be asked to throw this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3,
you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project
B. If the die shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B.
B.2.2 GR-Pre
Before you will take your decision, you will be confronted with the risk of losing
all your working money. Note: if this happens to you we still ask you to take
a decision concerning the distribution of your working money over the projects
(but you will not be paid out the earnings from the projects).
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns of project B.
Each participant has just received a white die. In the next phase everyone will
be asked to throw this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
31nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3,
you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project
B. If the die shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B.
B.2.3 GR-Inter
At the beginning of the following phase, thus after you made your decision but
before the outcome of projects is determined, you will be confronted with the risk
of losing all your earnings. Only for those that keep their possible earnings the
following will then hold: Chance will determine for you the returns of project B.
Each participant has just received a white die. In the next phase everyone will
be asked to throw this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3,
you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project
B. If the die shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B.
B.2.4 GR-Post
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns of project B.
Each participant has just received a white die. In the next phase everyone will
be asked to throw this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3,
you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project
B. If the die shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B. At the end of the following phase, thus after the outcome from the projects is
decided, you will be confronted with the risk of losing all your earnings.
Money in Money in Certain Chance Money in Money in Certain Chance








0.00 15.00 0.00 37.50 8.00 7.00 8.00 17.50
0.50 14.50 0.50 36.25 8.50 6.50 8.50 16.25
1.00 14.00 1.00 35.00 9.00 6.00 9.00 15.00
1.50 13.50 1.50 33.75 9.50 5.50 9.50 13.75
2.00 13.00 2.00 32.50 10.00 5.00 10.00 12.50
2.50 12.50 2.50 31.25 10.50 4.50 10.50 11.25
3.00 12.00 3.00 30.00 11.00 4.00 11.00 10.00
3.50 11.50 3.50 28.75 11.50 3.50 11.50 8.75
4.00 11.00 4.00 27.50 12.00 3.00 12.00 7.50
4.50 10.50 4.50 26.25 12.50 2.50 12.50 6.25
5.00 10.00 5.00 25.00 13.00 2.00 13.00 5.00
5.50 9.50 5.50 23.75 13.50 1.50 13.50 3.75
6.00 9.00 6.00 22.50 14.00 1.00 14.00 2.50
6.50 8.50 6.50 21.25 14.50 0.50 14.50 1.25
7.00 8.00 7.00 20.00 15.00 0.00 15.00 0.00
7.50 7.50 7.50 18.75
32C Tables
Table 4: Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions
Part A: GR-Pre Part B: GR-Post
1 obs. left-censored; 1 obs. left-censored;
11 obs. right-censored 10 obs. right-censored
Number of obs = 48 Number of obs = 42
LR χ2(5) = 8.08 LR χ2(5) = 6.40
Prob > χ2 = 0.152 Prob > χ2 = 0.269
Cox Snell R2 = 0.155 Cox Snell R2 = 0.141
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t| invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.003 0.006 0.645 ANXIETY-trait 0.004 0.007 0.641
ANXIETY-1 -0.002 0.005 0.701 ANXIETY-1 -0.002 0.007 0.753
HOPE-1 0.052 0.081 0.526 HOPE-1 0.079 0.088 0.378
IRRITATE-1 -0.037 0.081 0.649 IRRITATE-1 0.130 0.072 0.078
REJOICE-R 0.080 0.034 0.024 REJOICE-R 0.080 0.050 0.119
Intercept 0.638 0.435 0.150 Intercept 0.137 0.446 0.761
Part C: Baseline-high Part D: GR-Post-high
1 obs. left-censored; 1 obs. left-censored;
6 obs. right-censored 7 obs. right-censored
Number of obs = 39 Number of obs = 29
LR χ2(5) = 10.35 LR χ2(5) = 23.75
Prob > χ2 = 0.066 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Cox Snell R2 = 0.233 Cox Snell R2 = 0.559
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t| Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait 0.001 0.006 0.841 ANXIETY-trait -0.002 0.007 0.746
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.006 0.547 ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.006 0.999
HOPE-1 0.234 0.088 0.012 HOPE-1 0.082 0.081 0.317
IRRITATE-1 -0.014 0.099 0.891 IRRITATE-1 0.133 0.101 0.200
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.042 0.014 REJOICE-R 0.153 0.028 0.000
Intercept -0.395 0.447 0.383 Intercept 0.119 0.443 0.791
Table 5: Spearman correlations for anxiety, hope and irritation




(p = 0.039) (p = 0.001)
IRRITATE-1 0.253 0.333 -0.187
(p = 0.028) (p = 0.003) (p = 0.106)




(p = 0.132) (p = 0.932)
IRRITATE-1 0.239 0.212 -0.340
GR-Post-low (p = 0.212) (p = 0.178) (p = 0.027)
IRRITATE-1 0.246 0.153 -0.128
GR-Post-high (p = 0.116) (p = 0.430) (p = 0.509)
33Table 6: Overview of investment behavior from all treatments.
A: Summary of investment (t1)
N mean: std. dev.: N mean: std. dev.:
fraction [points] fraction [points] fraction [points] fraction [points]
Baseline 37 0.521 [7.811] 0.226 [3.386] GR-Inter 39 0.662 [9.923] 0.274 [4.106]
Baseline-high 39 0.533 [16.00] 0.249 [7.459] GR-Post 42 0.623 [9.345] 0.273 [4.091]
Baseline-without 43 0.584 [8.756] 0.234 [3.506] GR-Post-high 29 0.554 [16.62] 0.306 [9.186]
GR-Pre 48 0.606 [9.083] 0.258 [3.865] GR-Post-without 40 0.575 [8.625] 0.253 [3.796]
B: Signiﬁcance levels for diﬀerences in investment
Mann-Whitney Kolm.-Smirnov Mann-Whitney Kolm.-Smirnov
Prob > |z| p Prob > |z| p
Baseline vs Baseline-high 0.859 0.600 GR-Pre vs GR-Inter 0.247 0.312
Baseline-without 0.105 0.224 GR-Post 0.653 0.949
GR-Pre 0.117 0.454 GR-Post-high 0.276 0.039
GR-Inter 0.011 0.012 GR-Post-without 0.548 0.954
GR-Post 0.062 0.103
GR-Post-high 0.845 0.229 GR-Inter vs GR-Post 0.495 0.676
GR-Post-without 0.378 0.653 GR-Post-high 0.129 0.026
GR-Post-without 0.103 0.161
Baseline-high vs Baseline-without 0.121 0.132
GR-Pre 0.154 0.086 GR-Post vs GR-Post-high 0.196 0.092
GR-Inter 0.025 0.031 GR-Post-without 0.341 0.699
GR-Post 0.087 0.197
GR-Post-high 0.830 0.738 GR-Post-high vs GR-Post-without 0.431 0.151
GR-Post-without 0.337 0.409
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